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Xfirst glance, Paul von Hindenburg's election as president on26 April 1925 confirmed the prevalence of monarchist senti-ment in Weimar Germany. Contemporary observers on the
Left and the Right agreed that Hindenbmg's appeal rested on the
recollection of Germany's imperial legacy and World War triumphs.
Born in 1847, a cadet in the Pmssia of Wilhelm I, a lieutenant at
Koniggratz, a colonel in the Franco-Pmssian War, and attaining fame
and distinction at Tannenberg in the First World War, Hindenburg was
nearly a composite of modern Germany history. His personal link to
a glorious Pmssian past fascinated early biographers; as a child, the
story goes, Hindenburg once held the hand of a veteran who had
fought under Frederick the Great. 1 Unfurling the black-white-red col-
ors of the Kaisen-eich, marching in paramilitary formation to the ac-
companiment of brass bands, reverently displaying photographs of
the president, Hindenburg's jubilant, mostly middle-class Protestant
supporters lent credibility to the notion that voters had elected an
Ersatzkaiser or substitute monarch. The German people didn't want a
president, but "a man in a uniform ... with a lot of decorations,"
scoffed Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann in a widely cited private
opinion. 2
The lesson of 1925 seemed to be how little had changed since 1913,
when Germans had bathed so carelessly in the glory of Wilhelm II's
silverjubilee. These circumstances delighted nationalists, who rejected
the legitimacy of the Weimar Republic, persuaded themselves of its
1. Gerhard Schultze-pfaelzer, Wie Hindenbllrg Reichspriisident wllrde: PersSnliche Eindriicke ails
sei"er Umgehtmg var rmd "ach der Wahl (Berlin, 1925), 7.
2. Quoted in Erich Eyck, Geschichte der Weimarer Repllblik (Zurich, [954), I:45 I. In a slightly
different version, Helmut Heiber, Die Republik VOIl Weimar (Munich, [966), 171. See also Henry
Ashby Turner, Stresel1UIllll 'lIld the Politics of the Weimar Republic (Princeton, 1963), [95-203.
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transiency, and spoke in the name of a supposedly authentic, under-
ground nation which republican institutions had neglected and Hin-
denburg's victory finally restored to view. 3 Most republicans offered
a similar analysis. They regarded the election as a serious blow to the
Weimar state and ominously warned against the gathering forces of
monarchism and militarism. In a lead article in the left-leaning Berliner
Tageblatt, Theodor Wolff bitterly conceded that it was the republic that
had "lost the battle. "4
Historians have not challenged these basic assumptions, although
they arc careful to point out that at least until 1930 Hindenburg dis-
charged his constitutional duties with integrity. Weimar was not as
badly served as any number of democrats had at flrst believed in 1925.
Some thoughtful commentators such as Harry GrafKessler even pre-
dicted that Hindenburg's enormous popularity would enhance the
legitimacy of the republic. 5 These hopes proved overly sanguine,
however. Debilitating quarrels over the colors of the national flag, the
reform of the constitution, and the direction ofWeimar foreign policy
dominated the second half of the 1920S and deepened the divisions
between mostly working-class republicans and bourgeois nationalists.
As Harold James has recently reminded us, "democracy and nation-
alism stood as opposites"; a guiding sense of the political nation or an
adherence to an embracing political civility was not attainable. n The
result was fragile parliamentary coalitions, which strengthened the
disposition ofHindenburg and his advisors, particularly Hindenburg's
son, Oskar, and General Kurt von Schleicher, to reassert presidential
authority at the expense of the Reichstag. The opportunity to do so
presented itself in March 1930, after the German People's Party finally
quit the "Grand Coalition" government with the Social Democrats
and once Hindenburg began using his office to prop up the authority
3. Walter H. Kaufmann, Almwrrhisn1 in the Weimar Republic (New York, 1953), 149·
4. Berliner Tageblatt, no. 197, 27 Apr. 1925, quoted in Hagen Schulze, IVeimar: Deutschland
1917-1933 (Berlin, 1982),296.
5. Gordon Craig, Germany 1866'-1945 (New York, 1978), 510-11; Heiber, Die Republik von
Weimar, 172. See also Hugh Quigley and R T. Clark, Republican Germany: A Political and
Economic Study (London, 1928), 93·
6. Critical assessments of Hindcnburg's presidency can be found in Eberhard Kolb, The
Weimar Republic, trans. P. S. Falla (London, 1985), 74-75; and Schulze, Weimar, 298-300. On
the absence ofa shared sense ofnation, see HaroldJames, A German Identity: 1770-1990 (London,
1989), 111; and Wolfgang Ribbe, "Flaggcnstreit undHeiliger Hain: Bemerkungenzur nationalen
Symbolik in der Weimarer Republik," in Dietrich Kurze, ed., Aus Theorie und Praxis der Ge-
schichtswissensch.y;: restschrijijUr Hans Herzfeld zum 80. Geburtstag (Berlin, 1972), 175-88 .
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of the new chancellor, the conservative Catholic politician, Heinrich
BrilningJ
Attentive investigations ofHindenburg's political interventions and
the origins of presidential government have tended to fix the focus of
study on 1930 rather than 1925 and, at the same time, to accept the
conventional view that the Hindenburg electorate in 1925 was a largely
conservative body, steadfastly antirepublican, but also basically mon-
archist, more tied to the cultural universe and political expectations of
prewar Germany than to the sterner viilkisch prescriptions of postwar
National Socialism. Nineteen twenty-five was monarchism's last hur-
rah in Germany. Only the widespread disappointment in Hinden-
burg's inability to reestablish the political repose of the Second Empire
compromised the lingering appeal of monarchism and thereby pre-
pared the rise of Nazism, argues Walter Kaufmann in his careful po-
litical analysis. 8 Other historians note as well the long, nostalgic look
backwards, by which burghers in the mid-1920s glanced beyond the
turmoil of the November Revolution to formulate their aspirations
for the future ofGermany on the basis ofthe Wilhelmine past. Hinden-
burg owed his election to the "widespread longing for the 'good, old
days,'" explains Helmut Heiber in his influential history ofthe Weimar
Republic. 9 Theodor Eschenburg and Hagen Schulze make the same
point implicitly, referring to Hindenburg as an "Ersatzkaiser."l0 The
guiding assumption is that voters responded intuitively and uncriti-
cally to Hindenburg's own professed monarchist convictions. "The
savior," as the election posters proclaimed the candidate Hindenburg,
appeared to promise a resumption of German history where it had
been interrupted in 1918. Walter Kaufmann refers to the "childlike
faith" which millions of Germans invested in the heroic figure of
Tannenberg. 11
7. Werner Conze, "Die Krise des Parteienstaats in Deutschland 1929/30," in GotthardJasper,
ed., Von Weimar zu Hitler 1930-1933 (Cologne, 1968),27-57; Theodor Eschenburg, "The Role
of the Personality in the Crisis of the Weimar Republic," in Hajo Holborn, ed., Republic to Reich:
The Making oj the Nazi Revolution (New York, 1972), 3-50; Karl Dietrich Bracher, "Demokratie
lmd Machtvakuum: Zum Problem des Parteienstaats in der Auflosung der Weimarer Republik,"
in Karl D. Erdmann and Hagen Schulze, eds., Weimar: Selbstpreisgabe einer Demokratie: Eine
Bilanz hettte (DUsseldorf, 1980), 109-34.
8. Kaufmann, .~onarchism in the Weimar Republic, 151-52,229-38.
9· Heiber, Die Republik von Weimar, 172.
10. Eschenburg quoted by Heiber, Die Republik von Weimar, 171; and Schulze, Weimar, 297.
I r. Kaufmann, Monarchism in the Weimar Republic, IS0.
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Unfortunately there has been little critical examination of these
assumptions. Werner COl1Ze's description on-Endenburg as "the most
populist [volksUimlich J personification of the monarchy," with the
stress put on tbe novel reworking of old clements, has largely gone
unnoticed. 12 Perhaps because provincial burghers, the mainstay of
Hindenburg's electorate, are taken to be politically passive and senti-
mentally nostalgic, allowing themselves to be harnessed by the same
people again and again, "for the tenth time, for the twelfth time," in
Theodor Wolff's mocking words, they are not very interesting to
historians. 13 There are, however, powerful reasons to reexplore Hin-
denburg's appeal.
Hindenburg's election anticipated the novel and dramatic growth
of the National Socialists. As Jurgen Falter and Dirk Hanisch have
recently shown, the Hindenburg vote in 1925 is one of the best pre-
dictors of the Nazi vote in September 1930 and July 193214 This
strong correlation alone docs not make Hindenburg voters early Nazis
or Nazi voters diehard monarchists; social combinations do not of
themselves indicate political motivations. But it does suggest that the
broad social coalition supporting the Nazis had assembled before and
was not solely a product of economic hard times in the early 1930S.
Evidently antisocialist Sammlungspolitik or politics of unity---the illu-
sive dream of the German Right-could succeed under the proper
conditions.
A local study of Hindenburg festivity in the predominantly Protes-
tant north German region ofLower Saxony reveals that while support
for I-Endenburg turned out to be broad and enthusiastic there is little
reason to believe it resolutely monarchist or reminiscent of prewar
nationalism. The accents ofPotsdam and the gestures ofthe Hohenzol-
lerns were remarkably muted. Indeed, since the November Revolu-
tion nationalist endeavors displayed an increasingly populist political
style that eschewed the social rigidity and official choreography of the
Wilhelmine period. The way in which Hindenburg was celebrated by
the nationalist Biirgertul1l underscored the changing requirements of
12. Erdmann and Schulze. Weinwr: Selbstprrisgabe eiller Demokratie, 47·
13. Berliller Tagcblatt, 110. 197,27 Apr. 1925, quoted in Schulze, Weimar, 296.
14. Jiirgen W Falter and Dirk Hanisch, "Die Anfalligkeit von Arbeitern gegenliber der
NSDAP bei dm Reichstagswahlen 192k-1933," Archiv.fiir Sozialgeschichte 26 (I 9k6), and Falter.
"The Two Hindcnburg Elections of 1925 and 1932: A Total Reversal of Voter Coalitions," in
this issue.
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right-wing politics in postwar Germany. The presidential campaign
in spring 1925 and Hindenburg ceremonial in the years that followed
draw attention to the social breadth and also to the political agility and
aggressive bearing that came to distinguish Weimar nationalism. This
paper thus contributes to the growing literature reexamining politics
in the 1920S, a decade which is reviewed here not so much as a period
of stalemate between the old Germany and the new or between
monarchism and the republic, but as one of profound realignment in
middle-class party loyalties and reformulation in political styles and
capacities. 15 There is a neglected prehistory to National Socialism;
the Hindenburg campaign indicates that the popular insurgency that
brought the Nazis to prominence and power was neither the exclusive
creature of Hitler or Goebbels or specifically Nazi organizational tal-
ents nor simply the consequence of the Great Depression. "Radical
nationalism" was a much more durable and prevalent feature of the
postwar years than has been conventionally believed.16
Hindenburg's election confirmed the rightward drift in Weimar
politics that had begun as early as June 1920, when strong advances
by the right-of-center German People's Party (DVP) and the resolutely
antirepublican German National People's Party (DNVP) registered
public fury over the Versailles settlement and renewed fears about
working-class unrest that had mounted after the March 1920 Kapp
Putsch. The fortunes of the nationalist Right continued to improve
during the chaotic years of hyperinflation. While the liberal parties,
the German Democratic Party (DDP) and even Gustav Stresemann's
DVP, lost momentum, a host of anti-Semitic and volkisch parties,
including Hitler's National Socialists, attracted considerable support
during the difficult years 1923 and 1924. As late as May 1924, when
a margin of economic stability had returned, the Nazis garnered 6.5
percent of the national vote, somewhat more in Protestant areas such
as Lower Saxony. More mainstream nationalist groupings such as the
veterans' association Stahlhelm enjoyed great popularity as well and
15. Thoma~ Childers, in particular, has argued for a closer examination of the 19205. See his
contribution "Inflation, Stabilization, and Political Realignment in Germany, 1924-1928," in
Gerald D. Feldman et aI., eds., Die Deutsche Inflation: Eine ZlIJischenbiianz/The German Inflation
Reconsidered: A Preliminary Balance (Berlin and New York, 1982).
16. The term "radical nationali~m" is from Geoff Eley, Reshaphlg the German Right: Radical
Nationalism and Political Change after Bismarck (New Haven, 1980), 201 -2, 351- 57. See also David
Blackbourn and Geoff Eley, The Peculiarities of German History: Bmllgeois Society and Politics in
NiHeteenth-CetltlJlY Germany (New York, 1984), 23.
Copyright © 2001. All Rights Reserved.
210 Hindenburg's 1925 Election
established permanent branches in neighborhoods across Germany. 17
With the May 1924 Reichstag elections, the ultranationalist DNVP
emerged as the largest party in Germany, with some 20 percent ofthe
vote. Weimar Democrats, by contrast, almost disappeared from view,
having garnered only 5.6 percent, down from 18.6 percent inJanuary
19 I9. Ecstatic nationalists took these indications to be ofa single piece.
Newspapermen lauded the patriotic spirit of the paramilitary associa-
tions and without distinction lumped these and DVP, DNVP, and
volkisch voters together as a recognizable "national opposition," as-
sembled under the black-white-red flag of the Kaiserreich to oppose
the Weimar Republic. 18
The swelling vote totals for the nationalist parties did not translate
into automatic nationalist union, however. Bitter conflicts divided
volkisch activists from German Nationalists and persisting resentment
over Stresemann's late-summer 1923 coalition with the Social Demo-
crats, his termination of passive resistance in the French-occupied
Ruhr, and his conciliatory foreign policy kept the two largest nation-
alist parties, the DVP and the DNVP, apart. In addition, the hardships
of hyperinflation and the fiscal rigors of the stabilization that followed
led various disaffected middle-class interest groups to launch their
own political slates, particularly in local elections. Although support
for splinter parties such as the Business Party or creditor parties re-
mained limited in 1924, their appearance indicated how virulent hos-
tilities among embattled middle-class constituents had become. In
these circumstances of political difference and social and economic
resentment, it took months of negotiations and a second Reichstag
election on 7 December 1924 before a right-of-center Biirgerblock,
joined by the DVP, DNVP, and the Catholic Center (but, significantly,
not the DDP), was finally assembled inJanuary 1925 under the chan-
cellorship of Hans Luther.
The fragile nature of the governing coalition was underscored dur-
ing February and March, when parliamentary leaders and elder na-
tionalist statesmen, constituting themselves as a Reichsblock, disagreed
17. Volker R. Berghahn, Der Stah/helm: Bund der Frantsaldaten 1918-1935 (Diisseldorf, 1966).
Contemporary accounts of the Stahlhelm in Lower Saxony include Hans Brenning, 10 Jahre
Stahlhelm: Kreisgruppe Oldenburg (Oldenburg, 1930); and O. Lippelt and E. Huckstorf,Funfzehn
Jahre Stahlhelm in Niedersachsen (Braunschweig, 1936).
18. See, for example, Der Burger, no. 17, 17 Feb. 1924; Gaslarsche Zeitung, no. 131, 4 Apr.
1924; Hannoversche Kuner, no. 229. 16 May 1924; and Braul15chweigische Landeszeitung, no. 125,
5 May 1924.
Copyright © 2001. All Rights Reserved.
Peter Fritzsche 2II
over a common candidate for Germany's upcoming presidential elec-
tions, which Friedrich Ebert's sudden death had made imminent.
Finally, KarlJarres, the DVP mayor ofDuisburg, proved agreeable to
both Stresemann liberals, who required a candidate acceptable to the
Allies, and hardline German Nationalists, who demanded a figure
with strong monarchist sympathies.19
Despite the infighting in Berlin that surrounded his nomination,
Jarres's candidacy stirred considerable excitement in bourgeois neigh-
borhoods. Although hopes for a united antisocialist front crumbled
once the Catholic Center and German Democrats fielded their own
candidates, who campaigned alongside Erich LudendortT, the volkisch
candidate; the Social Democratic Minister President of Prussia, Otto
Braun; and the Communist leader, Ernst Thalmann, the Reichsblock
cobbled together a broad nationalist combination. At the local level,
most ofthe nonsocialist, Protestant community supportedJarres. Pas-
sionate differences between liberals and conservatives over Strese-
mann's foreign policy, the acceptability of reforming the republican
state from within, and economic and fiscal matters were laid to rest,
at least for a time. In Braunschweig, for example, representatives of
the DVP and DNVP as well as middle-class splinter parties constituted
the local Reichsblock. In addition, spokesmen for artisans, retailers,
farmers, industrialists, and Christian workers joined, as did leaders of
the patriotic organizations. 20 At a time when a half-dozen special-
interest parties threatened to make inroads into the long-established
liberal and conservative electorates, and in Braunschweig had already
fielded separate lists in Landtag and municipal elections, and when the
pro-business policies of Chancellor Hans Luther unsettled Christian
workers, dispossessed savers, and small tradespeople, the combination
in support of Jarres was a noteworthy accomplishment. Given the
centrifugal forces in Weimar politics and the already wide Held of
candidates, the Reichsblock coalition could easily have flown apart.
For all the sturdy support he received from Protestant liberals and
conservatives, Jarres had only a slim chance of winning the second
19. Noel Cary, "The Making of the Reich President, 1925: German Conservatism and the
Nomination ofPaul von Hindenburg," in this issue. See also Andreas Dorpalen, Hindenburg and
the Weimar Republic (Princeton, (964), 64-67.
20. "Wahlauschuss flir die Reichsprasident-Kandidatur," 1 I Mar. 25 meeting, Stadtarchiv
Braunschweig, G X 6/406. For Goslar, see Goslarsche Zeitung, no. 72, 26 Mar. 1925; and for
Celie, see Peter Volker, "Wahlen und politische Parteien in Raum Celie von 1867 bis 1972" (Ph. D
e1iss., Hanover, (977),210-12.
Copyright © 2001. All Rights Reserved.
212 HindenbI1~R'5 1925 Election
round once Social Democrats rallied around the respected Center
Party candidate, Wilhelm Marx, who now campaigned in the name
of the republican Volkshlock. Jarres was a well-liked party leader, but
not a commanding public figure who could draw needed support
from conservative Bavarian Catholics or wayward democrats. I-lin-
denburg seemed to offer a way out of this predicament. Once he was
persuaded to run in place ofJarres, opposition to his candidacy melted
away. Gustav Stresemann and other liberal leaders, who resented the
cavalier wayJarres had been treated and who worried about the effects
a Hindenburg presidency would have on the republic's foreign policy,
muffied their objections. The nationalist enthusiasm that surged once
Hindenburg entered the race also put to rest the fcars of those patriots
who balked at pulling the aged hero of Tannenberg through the dirt
of Weimar politics. 21 In the two weeks before the election, the
Reichsblock oversaw unprecedented political activism which mustered
even the "most quiescent" burghers, as Bad Harzburg's newspaper
noted. Often for the first time since the war, small-town burghers
found themselves swept up in the passions of public politics. I-Enden-
burg electioneering resembled civic work; choirs, athletic clubs, riflery
societies, guilds and other business groups, Christian organizations,
and housewives' associations all played leading roles. Even Social
Democrats, who had the resources of an impressive organizational
machine at their disposal and generally entered Weimar elections better
prepared than their nationalist opponents, conceded that this time the
presidential campaign had linked "the bourgeoisie" together in a "great
chain of reaction," down "to the last nun. "22
It was male paramilitary and veterans' groups which figured most
prominently in election work. Stahlhelm comrades, for example,
busily leafletted neighborhoods and outlying villages, stood guard at
rallies, and, on election day, drove voters to polling places. The Stahl-
helm also organized the exuberant parades and demonstrations that
took place across the provinces. In I-Endenburg's adopted city of
Hanover, for example, veterans marched in the first ranks of a tumul--·
tuous parade the Sunday before the election. It was the only time that
Hindenburg made a personal appearance in the campaign and the city
dressed itself up accordingly. On this "I-Endenburg Sunday," Hanover
was draped with black-white-red bunting; burghers flew thousands
21. Dorpalen, Hindenlntrg, 70--74.
22. Harzsche Zeitung, no. 99, 27 Apr. 1925; vOlksfi'euHd (Braunschweig), no. 85, [ I Apr. 1925.
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of imperial flags from their homes and apartments, beginning the
political custom of unfurling partisan loyalties and counting flags to
measure party passions which would continue until 1933. Accus-
tomed to the red flags, folksy garlands, and other visible political
adornments of the socialist movement since the tum of the century,
nationalists must have been heartened as they surveyed Hanover
wrapped in patriotic bunting. 23 Hanover sounded patriotic as well;
military bands blared throughout the provincial capital. Two hours
passed before Hanover's patriots and veterans completed the parade
circuit. 24 In the weeks before the 26 April election, smaller towns held
gatherings that were, in proportion, equally impressive.
Not attached to any particular party, the Stahlhelm, along with the
Young German Order, gave pro-Hindenburg assemblies a bipartisan,
above-party spirit. Indeed, Reichsblock leaders in Berlin were anxious
to avoid giving local party politicians a major role in the campaign and
urged that municipal notables and chairmen of recreational clubs pre-
side over campaign events. Hindenburg himself said that he did not
want anything to do with parties. The emphasis was on bourgeois
unity, and it was significant that the largest bourgeois parties, the DVP
and DNVP, played only subordinate roles in accomplishing that unity.
More and more, it was social clubs and patriotic associations which
joined together to provide vigorous examples ofnationalist renewal. 25
The Stahlhelm, in particular, presented an example of busy political
activity which burghers had previously only admired with unease in
the Social Democrats. However, by the time the Hindenburg election
was held, the political capacities ofnationalist burghers had improved
considerably, an important development that has generally been over-
looked. 26 Now "Germany not only has a mass organization ofthe Left
23. On political adornment, see George Mosse, The Nationalization of the Aiasses: Political
Symbolism and AI"ss Alovements ill Gef11lmty from the Napoleonic Wars through the Third Reich (New
York, 1975), particularly 162-82; and also Vernon Lidtke, The Altenwtiw Culture: Socialist Labor
ill Imperial Germally (New York, 1985).
24· Hmmoversche Kurier, no. 182, 20 Apr. 1925; and Schultze--Pfaelzer, Wie Hindellburg
Reichspriisidwt wurde, 24-26, 33.
25· See the untitled memorandum, no. 7 (dated 12 Mar. 1925), circulated by the Reichsblock,
in DVP party files, Bundesarchiv Koblenz, R 45Il1 121 107. See also Kaufmann, AIorwrchism ill
the Weimar Republic, '46. Rudy Koshar carefully analyzes the shift away from the established
parties in Social Life, Local Politics and Nazism: M"'burg, 1880-1935 (Chapel Hill, 1986).
26. Dorpalen, for example, emphasizes the pessimism and doubt in the Reichsblock campaign,
though he relies on the remarks ofBerlin politicians and not on local evidence. See Hillde.nburg, 8I.
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but also of the Right," exulted Bremen's Weser Zeitung on the occasion
of the Stahlhc1m's Front Soldiers' Day in 1927.27
Posters and flags went up and excitement mounted as election Sun-
day, 26 April, approached. Both the republican Volksblock and the
nationalist Reichsblock were confident of victory and held exuberant
market-square rallies throughout Germany on the eve of the election.
Once the polls closed at six the next everling, anxious crowds gathered
in front ofnewspaper offices to await the results as they came in, were
tabulated, and then publicly posted. An early lead by Marx kept ten-
sion high until midnight, by which time slower reports from more
conservative districts east of the Elbe River made it clear than I-Enden-
burg had won a narrow victory.2R
The election plainly exposed the sharp division of Weimar Ger-
many. In the second round of elections, in which Hindcnburg faced
off against Wilhelm Marx and the Communist Ernst Thalmann, who
remained in the race as a spoiler, German voters divided almost evenly;
48 percent voted for Hindenburg, 45 for Marx. Neither the \vclcome
onset of more stable and more prosperous economic conditions after
the end of inflation in 1924 nor the foreclosure of armed threats to
republican rule changed what at the local level was an increasingly
strict divide between democratic Left and nationalist Right. That the
Catholic vote split between Marx and Hindcnburg, whom the conser-
vative Bavarian People's Party endorsed, and many workers supported
Thalmann only reinforced the solidity of the nonsocialist, Protestant
electorate which had enthusiastically backed Hindenburg.
The day after the election, Hindenburg's supporters took to the
streets in unprecedented numbers, confident that with Hindenburg's
victory, the advance of socialism and republican rule had been deci-
sively halted. In Goslar, a town of some 25,000 inhabitants which had
a substantial working-class minority, a victory parade organized by
the Stahlhelm, regimental groups, and the Men's Gymnastic League,
led hundreds of burghers through the narrow streets of the medieval
town to the market place. There the nationalist editor of the local
paper, August Wilhelm Silgradt, congratulated Germans for making
their way out ofthe labyrinth of revolution and onto "the straight path
of honor. "29 In Helmstedt, patriotic associations, riflery clubs, and
27. Wes£r Zeitung (Bremen), no. 247, 7 May 1927.
28. Schultze-Pfaelzer, Wie Hindenhurg Reic!lspriLlidenl U'Ulde, 41-43.
29. Goslarsc!le Zeilul1g, no. 97, 27 Apr. 1925; and no. 99, 29 Apr. 1925. A geneT'll overview
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student fraternities, with flags and bands, marched in "great num-
bers," followed by enthusiastic townspeople. Across Germany, bur-
ghers decorated their homes with black-white-red banners and rallied
around local war monuments or Bismarck columns to demonstrate
Hindenburg's triumph. The German Right was brimming with con-
fidence and dearly gathering political momentum. 30
Often enough, Hindenburg celebrants turned against Social Demo-
crats. The flip side to nationalist unity was antisocialist vigilance. As
if a single election had overturned the balance of domestic power,
Social Democrats increasingly found themselves under physical at-
tack. Hindenburg revelers in Bremen marched provocatively past the
local trade union house and, on the day ofHindenburg's inauguration,
beat up socialists milling outside. 31 The day after the election, crowds
in Gottingen gathered in front of the home of Social Democratic
Reichstag deputy Schiller, who was also editor of the local socialist
paper, to shout curses and smash windows. Fistfights with leftists also
marked celebrations in Schoningen and Gandersheim. 32 This sort of
rough curbside politics did not assume the proportions ofSA violence
later in the 1930S, but it showed a new belligerence among nationalists
and confirmed once more the sharp polarization of German com-
munities. Social Democrats, in any case, remarked on the rising threat
that the insurgent Stahlhelm posed throughout the provinces; their
paramilitary force, the Reichsbanner, was apparently no match, and
socialist organizational efforts accordingly suffered: attacks on work-
ers went unpunished; small-town sympathizers grew increasingly re-
luctant to join socialist dubs; and more and more tavern-owners,
watchful of the political tide, refused anymore to rent out their back
rooms for meetings. The retreat ofthe socialists, which William Sheri-
dan Allen and others chart in the 19305, began already in the mid-
19205.33
of Goslar politics is provided by Lieselotte Krull. Wahlen und Wahh'erhalten in Coslar LVi:ihrer,d der
Weiftlarer Republik (Goslar, 1982).
30. Hannoversche Kuner, no. 99, 29 Apr. 1925; Harzsche Zeitzmg, no. IOO, 28 Apr. 1925;
Candersheimer Kreisblatt, no. 99, 29 Apr. 1925; and Schi;nitlger Zeitung, no. 98, 28 Apr. 1925.
31. See reports prepared by Bremen police, dated T3 Apr. 1925 and 2 Oct. 1925, Bremisches
Staatsarchiv, Nachrichtenstelle der Polizeidirektion, 4.65, 89S!r63/87.
32· Volksblatt (GOttingen), 28 Apr. [92S; Schoninger Zeitutlg, no. 98, 28 Apr. 1925; and Ganders-
heiftler Kreisblatt, no. 99, 28 Apr. [92S.
33· See, for example, the assessments in Braunschweig's ~{Jlkifreutld, no. lOS, 7 May 1925;
no. 280, 30 Nov. 1927; and no. [3, 16Jan. 1928, and William Sheridan Allen, The Nazi Seizure
ofPoLVer: The Experience ofa Single Cerman Town, 1922-1945, rev. ed. (New York, 1984).
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The 1925 presidential elections revealed the extent to which Protes-
tant burghers came to identify themselves as partisans of avowedly
bl¥rgerlich political groupings. Municipal elections, held throughout
Prussia in November 1924, had already registered the popularity of
local BiirgerblO'cke and the precipitant decline of willing mediators such
as the German Democrats, who generally declined to join explicitly
antisocialist coalitions and consequently saw their political authority
evaporate. Socialists and burghers glared at each other over a martial
divide. After I-Endenburg's election, one Social Democratic journalist
surveyed the street of Oelber, his Lower Saxon hometown. He named
names and provided addresses: Steigertahl, the village pastor, osten-
tatiously displayed the partisan black-white-red banner of the Reichs-
block. Imperial politics apparently ran in the family; Steigertahl's son,
along with Dassler and the locksmith Muller, had ripped republican
ribbons off the local monument. Living at house number 70, the
widow of Social Democrat Fricke also flew the imperial colors. At the
top of the street, at number I, the farmer Heinrich Grasshoff was a
notorious Stahlhelm activist. 34 After the Hindenburg election, Oel-
ber's townspeople, like Germans elsewhere, took sides with greater
ease and observed a stricter partisanship. Outside the largest cities,
there was little confusion about social roles and political orientations.
This was the case in Lower Saxony, but also in traditionally democratic
regions, as Ernst Glaeser's novel about provincial life in Weimar-era
Wiirttemberg, The Last Civilian, makes clear. 35 The relative political
civility which still prevailed in the mid-I920s should not obscure the
deep social divide that split German communities.
It is important to emphasize that the grass roots combination sup-
porting Hindenburg was not simply a fair-weather coalition uniting
around a single candidate in a runoff election but breaking apart once
the daily business of parliamentary interest politics resumed. Over the
coming seasons, burghers assembled again and again to displdy the
nationalist union that Hindenburg had tugged together. JLIst as the
birthday of the kaiser or Bismarck had occasioned patriotic ceremony
before the war, so did Hindenburg's birthday on 2 October after the
war. Commemorations to honor the president were already held pri-
34. Valksfreund (Braunschweig), no. 162, 15July 1925.
35. Ernst Glaeser, The Lost Cil'iliol1, trans. Gwenda David and Eric Mosbacher (New York,
1935)·
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vately in I925 and I926, but when Hindenburg turned eighty in I927,
bourgeois neighborhoods erupted in festivity.
The celebration ofHindenburg's birthday in I927 closely resembled
the political campaign in I925. Reichsblock confronted Volksblock. Un-
less they served in an official capacity as mayor or Landrat, Social
Democrats refused to join ceremonies to honor the president, in
Aurich claiming that local governments had never commemorated
Ebert, even at his death, or in Goslar decrying the ubiquitous imperial
banners, though they acknowledged Hindenburg's fealty to the con-
stitution. 36 Socialist and Communist veterans' groups and working-
class choirs and athletic clubs simply stayed home on Hindenburg
Day. German Democrats and Catholics had more mixed feelings.
They praised Hindenburg, and perhaps even felt an emotional tug
walking past the hundreds of black-white-red flags that decorated
German towns on 2 October, but surely repudiated Hindenburg's
most boisterous nationalist supporters. Even so, in the "Golden Twen-
ties," Weimar lacked a holiday or institution or public figure that could
overcome, even intermittently, the deep political hostilities in the com-
munity; citizens contested the colors of the flag, ignored Constitution
Day ceremonies, and elected a president who revealed their fundamen-
tal differences more than he concealed them.
The fractured civic culture of the nation contrasted with the recur-
rent sense of unity and confidence that the Protestant BUrgerturn dem-
onstrated. City councils with a nationalist majority officially spon-
sored local Hindenburg Days and, as in Goslar, allocated funds and
permitted patriotic speeches to be made from the steps leading to city
hall. But it was ordinary members of neighborhood social clubs and
patriotic associations who played the leading roles, organizing parades
and rallies, putting on athletic tournaments and talent contests, and
outfitting the streets in black-white-red bunting. Goslar's organizing
committee, for example, composed the very picture of bourgeois
unity: local party politicians joined Stahlhelmers, the Committee of
Guilds and the chamber of commerce worked with the German Civil
Servants' League and the German National Union of Commercial
Employees, and the Protestant churches cooperated with the Catholic
36. Reichsbanner resolution, dated 18 Sept. 1927, Stadtarchiv Aurich in Niedersachsisches
Staatsarchiv Aurich, Dep. 34, Gedanktagc Verfassungsfeier, no. 191; Stadtarchiv Goslar, RR I
29/8.
Copyright © 2001. All Rights Reserved.
218 Hindenburg's 1925 Election
parish. 37 In the face of fractious party politics and querulous special
interests, which scarred small communities such as Goslar as much as
larger towns, Hindenburg ceremony offered burghers from all stations
the opportunity to publicly display a collective political identity.
Not until the last days ofJanuary 1933 would the enthusiasm and
confidence ofburghers be pitched as high as it was on 2 October 1927.
In tiny Esbeck, Hindenburg supporters assembled in the village's
largest room, the Nuthmannschen Hall, which was decorated for the
occasion with evergreen and imperial flags. Local authorities rose to
say a few words, but the focus of the commemoration was on local
clubs: one after the other, the village choir sang; the gymnastic associ-
ation tumbled; and members of the dramatic society read poems. 38
To honor Hindenburg, athletes in Rotenburg on the Wiimme climbed
on each other to form a human pyramid four stories high on which
assistants hung huge blown-up photographs of the president. After
this gymnastic marvel, Rotenburg's choirs provided less strenuous
musical entertainment. 39 Although the scale of festivity was more
grand in larger towns, the grass roots spirit remained the same. In
Osnabruck, for example, hundreds of schoolchildren and members
of the Stahlhelm, the Young German Order, regimental groups, riflery
clubs, athletic associations, singing societies, and guilds arrayed them-
selves in a huge parade through the city center. 40 Even in Berlin, where
hundreds of thousands of patriots climbed into special buses and
clogged the subways to line Unter den Linden and Friedrichstrasse,
the route ofHindenburg's motorcade, distinctive uniforms, hats, and
pins identified club members. Stahlhelm, Boy Scouts, the German
National Union ofCommercial Employees, DDP youth groups, trol-
lcymen -all formed a colorful chain of nonsocialist associationallife
in the giant metropolis. 41 Stahlhelm members could be found in the
middle of the celebrations again and again, hanging up bunting, or-
ganizing parades, leading neighbors. Their leadership roles at the very
center of civic activism underscored the Bii~gertum'snew militancy.
Overshadowed by subsequent events, the scale and reach ofHinden-
burg commemoration is largely forgotten. But Hindenburg's eigh-
37. Sec the files collected in Goslar's Stadtarchiv, RR I 29/8/ Ill.
38. Schb-'zinger Zeitzmg, no. 232. 4 Oct. 1~)27·
39. Rotenburger Anzeiger. no. 9772, 3 Oct. 1927·
40. Ostlabriickner Tageblatt, no. 13341,2 Oct. 1927.
41. Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, no. 462, 3 Oct. 1927.
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tieth birthday was a genuine nationalist coming out-a massive decla-
ration ofpolitical resolution and political accomplishment. It was this
black-white-red spectacle which impressed observers. Newspapers
published all sorts of statistics to take the measure of the crowds in
Berlin. Over 200,000 visitors arrived in the city on Hindenburg Day,
one report estimated. And whereas on a normal Sunday, 350,000
Berliners used buses and 4°0,000 took the subway, on Hindenburg
Sunday the numbers leaped to 500,000 and 600,000 respectively.42
The idea that the Deutschlandlied was being sung in thousands of fes-
tivals in neighborhoods and villages across Germany and beyond
charmed even the acerbic, extreme right-wing newspaper, Deutsche
Zeitung. 43 Whereas burghers had rarely marched openly in the streets
before 1924, leaving public arenas to the more active Social Demo-
crats, preferring to assemble indoors under the auspices of traditional
party leaders or staid Burgher League functionaries, Hindenburg's
election marked a turning point. A careful reading of local political
events in Lower Saxony indicates that burghers came to display openly
the black-white-red flag and, led by new and aggressive organizations
such as the Stahlhelm, to march through the streets and hold open-air
assemblies more frequently. As James Diehl argues, the Stahlhelm, in
particular, was widely credited for adopting more assertive working-
class tactics and taking to the streets more readily. Mobilization in
public became a vital measure for the political vitality of the German
Right. 44 As a consequence, Hindenburg festivity left a palpable sense
ofstrength and unity: "Germany is moving forward again," concluded
the editors of the influential Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung. 45
The Hindenburg celebrations remained a model for successful po-
litical mobilization. Already in spring 1925, immediately after Hin-
denburg's election, Friedrich Wilhelm von Loebell, chairman of the
national Reichsblock, had sought to make the Hindenburg coalition
permanent. Although the national federation of Burgher Leagues
(Biirgerbiinde), an antisocialist organization dating from the November
Revolution that Loebell chaired as well, had failed to unite burghers
42. Ibid.
43· Deutsche Zeitung, no. 23Ib, 3 Oct. 1927, evening edition.
44· See James Diehl, Paramilitary Politics in Weimar Germafly (Bloomington, Ind., 1977), Ill,
191. See also Peter Fritzsche, Rehearsalsfor Fascism: Populism and Politi[al.~lohilization in Weimar
Germany (New York, 1990).
45· Det.ttsche Allgemeine Zeitung, no. 461, 2 Oct. 1927.
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because it was too much a creature of a single party, thc DNVP,
Loebell argued that the presidential campaign had shown that the
major nonsocialist parties and interest groups could "overcome their
partisan perspectives." On that basis, they should work more closely
to revise the Weimar constitution and restore the black-white-red col-
ors to the national flag. 46 Loebell's proposal earned substantial support
from local party leaders in both the DVP and DNVP. After all, wrote
one German Nationalist from Osnabruck, Hindenburg's victory
proved what nationalist unity could achieve. 47 Indeed, the Reichsblock
slate won a major victory in June 1928 regional elections in the tradi-
tionally democratic state of Oldenburg; the DVP and DNVP would
never do so well there again.
Although Loebell's efforts were frustrated by party leaders deter-
mined to protect their own turf, the question of antisocialist unity
persisted. Newspaper editors such as Goslar's August Wilhelm Sil-
gradt repeatedly held Hindenburg celebrations up as the happy exam-
ple of cooperation. 48 The differences between the major bourgeois
parties were "unnatural," argued Braunschweig's LandeszeitunLI!' which
warmly endorsed proposals to enforce more cooperation. 49 In sum·-
mer 1926, for example, Karl Jarres and Baron Wilhelm von Gayl, who
were spokesmen in the upper chamber of the Prussian Landtag for the
DVP and DNVP respectively, issued an appeal for closer collaboration
between the two parties that won wide public acclaim. Stahlhelm
efforts to impose a nationalist agenda on the nonsocialist parties in
regional elections in Saxony in 1927 and in Braunschweig in 1928
earned applause as well. By the end of the decade, more and more
burghers expressed confidence in the goal of nationalist unity and
political renewal, something that I--lindenburg had made more credi-
ble, but they also came to see nationalist associations, which enforced
a political fellowship that eluded the traditional parties, as the best
means of achieving that goal. 50
The shift away from the traditional parties and political notables and
46. Loebell to Kempkes ct aI., 28 May 1l)25, Bundesarchiv Koblcnz, DVP party fjles. R
451I114!l 5-24.
47. Gustav Hagen to an unnamed pastor, 5 May Il)25. Nicdcrsachsisches Staatsarchiv Osna-
brUck, DNVP party fIles, Erw C 1/6/8.
48. See, for example, Coslorsclle Zeit/mg. no. 232. 3 Oct. 1l)25; and no. 247.21 Oct. 1l)26.
4<). BraIH1s(hu'c(~is(lle umdes.-:eitung. no. 3)), 3 Dec. 1<)26.
50. For details, sec Fritzsche, Rehearsalsfor Fasrisl/l. 160-64. 183-8.;.
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the focus on community activism is significant. It points to an increas-
ingly populist style and self-reliant aspect to bourgeois politics in the
1920S. Hindenburg was as popular as he was not simply because he
expressed political resentments against the Allies, the Social Demo-
crats, and the Weimar Republic but also because he oversaw a recon-
stitution of the nationalist community, particularly on the local level.
Nationalism was experienced differently in the Weimar years. In con-
trast to the officious ceremony of the Wilhelmine era, in which social
rank and military protocol dominated even in small towns and vil-
lages, Hindenburg Day revolved around voluntary associations and
relied on the energies ofprivate citizens. Parades composed by various
clubs and associations and joined by artisans, employees, Christian
workers, and women's groups; large market-square rallies; and private
gestures such as patriotic window dressing and the display of black-
white-red flags-all conveyed the heart-felt jubilation of burghers.
These celebrations resembled agemiitlich summer carnival or Schiitzen-
fist ofnational proportions, and had little in common with the careful
choreography of prewar Founding Day or Sedan Day ceremonies;
there were no strict social divisions between invited guests and pass-
ersby, no reviewing stands for municipal notables, and no fancy dress
balls. 51 Burghers themselves composed the spectacle. National feeling
was as high as it was because Hindenburg festivity mustered and
esteemed burghers of all social stations and at the same time presented
a united front against the working-class Left.
Hindenburg's Berlin, where Germany's first popularly elected pres-
ident was inaugurated on 12 May 1925, was no longer the imperial
capital of the prewar years. To Otto Kunze, a columnist for Munich's
Allgemeine Rundschau who had strenuously protested Hindenburg's
candidacy, the festivity resembled "the procession of a kaiser or a
king" before 19 I 4 - "and yet it was very different. " Kunze explained:
The crowds, garlands, and flags were the same. The color composition
black-white-red set the tone then as it did now. The cordons were also just
like before 1914. But back then the cordons were essential. They divided
spectators and principals. Outside the masses in their everyday clothes ...
inside a private party with . . . court dress and livery, medals and insignia
51. This impression comes from a reading ofvarious Braunschweig newspapers for the period
1900-1914. See in particular Helmstedter Tageblatt, no. 204, I Sept. 1913; no. 22, 27 Jan. 1913;
Braunschweigisrhe Neueste NachrichtcH, no. 23, 27 Jan. 191 I; no. 24, 28 Jan. 191 I; and no. 208, 5
Sept. 1911.
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whose fine differences few understood.... The whole thing was pure theater!
Metropolis and court had become two worlds.
Hindenburg's inauguration offered significant contrasts to this prewar
picture of privilege and rank. Hindenburg entered Berlin "in an au-
tomobile surrounded by police on rnotorcycles. Guests wore normal
evening dress." And the cheering masses were not excluded from the
ceremony, but played important roles as they gathered along the
parade route. Democratic scale rather than monarchical pomp gave
the ceremony its grandeur: "The procession stretched in a straight line
for seven kilometers; a million people were up and about; patriotic
associations lined the route with two hundred thousand men; the sky
was full of airplanes trailing streamers. "52 Other visitors commented
as well on "the authentic and genuine enthusiasm" they had witnessed
in the capital. 53 Burghers celebrated a patriotic J701kifest, comparable
to the Fourth ofJuly or Bastille Day. Nationalism had become volks-
tumlich and more socially embracing, something many critics felt miss··
ing in the stage-management of national holidays before the war. 54
Kunze's description accompanied photographs and drawings of
Hindenburg in which the national hero is framed by the exuberant
crowds. Published in the popular family weekly magazine, Die Woche,
one watercolor depicted Hindenburg's unruly procession through the
Brandenburg Gate; the happy crowds and unmanaged celebration in
the foreground vie with Hindenburg himself for the viewer's atten-
tion. In the drawings, workers cheer alongside well-to-do burghers;
caps are waved beside top hats. The serried ranks of military guards
and quiet protocol of prewar ceremony is entirely missing from these
pictures, which show noisy disorder and excited gestures. People are
waving and pushing and running. 55 Simplicissimu5 quickly recognized
this novel role of the crowd and joked about whether President Hin-
denburg would, in the course of his term, eventually come to meet
every German personally. Adopting the familiar phrases of the en-
52. Allgemeine Rundsr!Iau (Munich) 22 (2! May 1(25). See also Deutsches Volkstum II (1927),
884·
53. Braunschweigisehe Landeszeitwlg, no. 14°,21 May 1925.
54. For the prewar debate on national holidays, see Theodor Schieder, Das delAtsrhe Kaiserreich
I'on 1871 als Nationalstaat (Cologne, 1961), 125-53; Mosse, The NatiOlwlization of rhe AJasse;.
73-99; Hans Goldschmidt, "Der Sedantag als Nationalfeicrtag 1871 - J 914," DelAtsrhe RWldsehaiA
53 (1926),181-93.
55. Die Wodle 29 (I Oct. 1927), 1185.-88. Sec also IlllAstrir'te Zeitwlg (Leipzig), no. 43 09, [3
Oct. 1927; and Walter Bloem, Hin.denhur;g dey Deutsche (Berlin, 1(32).
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tertainment world, Gerhard Schultze-Pfaelzer, Hindenburg's press
spokesman before 1925, went so far as to call Hindenburg a "darling
of the people. "56 It was in deference to the requirements of more
democratic politics after war and revolution that so many commen-
tators fastened on Hindenburg's appeal to the crowd. A successful
nationalist movement had to be composed by populist gestures and
had to look forward to a more integrative and hospitable community,
and could not simply content itselfwith simple-minded rhetoric about
Versailles or corrupt republican functionaries.
Hindenburg ceremony in the 1920S reminds historians that there
was a basic political coherence to the Protestant Biirgertum. Well be-
fore the onset of the "Great Depression," disparate social and eco-
nomic constituents - employees, Christian workers, artisans, farmers,
and professionals - had come together to collaborate in political en-
deavors. Marching beneath the black-white-red flags of the Kaiser-
reich, displaying their numbers to alarmed socialists, applauding the
patriotic entertainment provided by neighborhood clubs, they recog-
nized themselves as political allies. To be sure, burghers never re-
pudiated their own occupational interests or fine social distinctions on
Hindenburg's account. Hindenburg did not impose a political settle-
ment on postwar social and economic conflict. As the 1920S closed,
an array of small single-interest parties appealing to homeowners,
creditors, artisans, and employees attracted more and more votes in
local and then national elections. By the time of the 1928 Reichstag
elections, splinter parties garnered more than 14 percent ofthe national
vote. To many observers, the impact of inflation and stabilization had
grated the Weimar polity into tiny special interest fragments. 57 During
the same period, the Biirgerblock coalition in Berlin fell apart over the
issue of the Locarno Treaty in October 1925. Rejoined in January
1927, it remained a rickety structure and finally collapsed little more
than a year later. As a result, relations between the DVP and DNVP
56. Schultze--Pfaelzer, Wie Hindenburg Reichspriisident lIlurde, 7. See also Walther Lambach, Die
Arbeitnehmerschaft und Hindenburg: Zum 80. Geburtstag des Reichsprasidenten," Deutsche
Handels-Wacht 34 (21 Sept. 1927). On Hindenburg's presidential trips, Walther Hubatsch, Hin-
deHburg und der Staat: Aus den Papieren des Generalfeldmarschalls und Reichpriisident von 1878 bis 1934
(Gottingen, 1966), 91-95.
57· Thomas Childers, "Inflation, Stabilization, and Political Realignment 1924-1928," in
Feldman et aI., eds., Die Deutsch" Inflation; Larry Eugene Jones, "The Dissolution of the
Bourgeois Party System in the Weimar Republic," in Richard Bessel and E. J. Feuchtwanger,
eds., Social Change and Political Dwelopment in the Weimar Republic (London, 1981 ).
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became impossibly bad. Nonetheless, party strife and divisive special
interest politics did not disassemble completely the local Biirgertum.
Hindenburg Days and Stahlhelm activity mustered social clubs and
civic resources and practiced burghers in the ways and means of
nationalist unity.
This sort of grass-roots festivity provided important examples of
what could be accomplished even if actual achievements often fell
short of public expectations. A durable DVP-DNVP Biirgerblock that
was at once hospitable to middle-class constituencies and vigilantly
antisocialist never came to pass. This sort ofpolitical unity had to await
the Nazis. But with Hindenburg, the provincial Stadtbild of Weimar
Germany changed considerably. For Social Democrats, the town
square had become more contested and morc dangerous; nationalist
parades often ended with socialists intimidated in local taverns or beat
up in alleyways. Burghers, by contrast, came to see their neighbor-
hoods, embellished as they were in black-white-red, in increasingly
familiar terms. This was so not only because patriotic rallies and
victory marches seemed to establish a nationalist claim on public spaces
but also because burghers participated in Hindenburg festivities in a
popular and informal manner. Political confidence and public poise
distinguished the small-town Burgertum, not nostalgia and despair. For
all the reactionary speechmaking they occasioned against the Weimar
Republic, Hindenburg Days indicated fundamental shifts in the polit-
ical capacities and popular expectations of Protestant burghers. Com-
munity support for Hindenburg did not translate into automatic sup-
port for other right-wing efforts such as the plebiscitarian campaign
against the Young Plan in autumn 1929 or the Harzburg Front in
October 193 I (which were too party-political in any case). Only the
Nazis were able to reassemble the sturdy neighborhood coalitions
which had backed Hindenburg, at first incompletely in September
1930, then much more successfully in the various 1932 elections. But
garnering overproportional support where Hindenburg had been
especially strong in 1925, the Nazis succeeded by drawing on earlier
traditions of nationalist mobilization and by remaining faithful to the
popular style and fraternal sense of participation that distinguished
Hindenburg festivity. Hardly a nostalgic remnant of another era, the
popular coalition behind I-Endenburg provided a glimpse of the kind
of nationalist fusion to come.
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The Two Hindenburg Elections of
1925 and 1932:
A Total Reversal of Voter Coalitions
JORGEN W. FALTER
I. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
T HE two Weimar presidential elections of March and April,1925 and 1932, are among the most fascinating and historicallysignificant elections of modem German history (see Table I).
They are fascinating for the electoral historian and the generalist alike
because of the virtually total reversal between 1925 and 1932 of the
voting coalitions that backed and brought to power the aged Field
Marshal Paul von Hindenburg. And they are historically extremely
significant because it was von Hindenburg who at least encouraged if
not sustained the creeping process ofdeparliamentarization after 1930,
a process that finally brought Hitler into power. It may be readily
speculated that another president, e. g., Wilhelm Marx, who as the
candidate of the Weimar coalition parties was Hindenburg's chief
opponent in 1925, would not so easily have dismissed Reich Chancel-
lor Heinrich Bruning in May of 1932. And Marx undoubtedly would
not have appointed the right-wing Center party dissident, Franz von
Papen, as Bruning's successor.
Astonishingly, these two really important Weimar elections have
yet to be adequately investigated by electoral historians. An analysis
of these elections therefore virtually has to start from scratch. The
outcome does not, perhaps, necessarily add something new to what
has been assumed by historians about the two Hindenburg elections.
The significance of the following analysis lies more in the fact that it
provides statistical confirmation for some more or less commonly
held but never sufficiently corroborated hypotheses. In the following,
I will tum first to the 1925 election in order to find out where-i.e.,
what parties-the Hindenburg voters came from, and what role was
played by the decision of the Catholic Bavarian People's Party (BVP)
225
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to back Hindenburg instead of the candidate of the Catholic Center
Party, Wilhelm Marx. Then I will examine the transition from 1925
to 1932. I will ask what statistical relations may be observed between
these two elections and, from a complementary perspective, what
social groups supported Hindenburg in 1925 and 1932, respectively.
In a third and final step I will try to find out if there really was a
significant voter fluctuation between the Communist candidate Ernst
Thalmann and AdolfHitler from the first to the second ballot of 1932,
as is so often alleged in contemporary and historical analyses of the
collapse of the Weimar Republic.
2. FROM WHAT PARTIES DID THE 1925 HINDENBURG VOTERS
COME, AND TO WHAT PARTIES DID THEY GO IN
SUBSEQUENT ELECTIONS?
Of course this question cannot be answered directly or beyond any
reasonable doubt, since we do not have any methodologically reliable
and representative opinion polls tor the Weimar period. What we can
do, however, is to look first at the statistical relationship between the
Hindenburg vote and the vote of other parties and candidates at the
level of the 1,200 German counties and cities of that period. The results
are statistically sound if we restrict the verbal interpretation of our
findings to the territorial, that is, the county, leveL Since we are,
however, much more interested in individual-level relationships, I will
try, in a second-statistically somewhat risky-step, to discern the
underlying (but unknown) "true" voting transitions to and from Hin-
denburg by means of multiple ecological regression analysis. 1
2.1. Some party-vote correlations of the 1925 Hindenburg vote
Table 2 presents two statistically more or less equivalent pieces of in-
formation: percentage distributions and correlation coefficients. Since
percentage distributions may be more readily understood by most
1. This analytical tool w~s first proposed by the German statistician Fritz Bernstein ("Ober
eine Methode, die soziologische und bevolkernngsstatistische Gliederung von Abstimmungen
bei geheimen Wahlverfahren statistisch zu ermittcln," Allgemeines Statistisches Archil! 22 l1932]:
253-56). It was reinvented some 20 years later by Leo A. Goodman, "Ecological Regressions
and the Behavior ofIndividuals," American Sociological Review 43 (1953): 557-72. For a compari-
son of the two versions of ecological regression sec Jan-Bernd Lohmoller and JUrgcn W. Falter,
"Some Further Aspects of Ecological Regression Analy,is," Qualtiy and Quantity 20 (19~6):
109-25. Still one of the best introductions to ecological regression analy,is for historians is an
article by Morgan Kousser. "Ecological Regression and the Analysis of Past Politics," Journal of
1I1terdisciplil1aty History 4 (1973174): 237-62.
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TABLE 1: RESULTS OF THE TWO WEIMAR PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS OF 1925
AND 1932
1925 1932
1st Ballot 2nd Ballot 1st Ballot 2nd Ballot
Jarres (Nationalist) 38.8 - - -
Held (Bavarian Cath.) 3.7 - - -
Ludendorff (Volkisch) 1.1 - - -
Braun (Social Dem.) 29.0 - - -
Marx (Center Party) 14.5 45.3 - -
Hellpach (Left Lib. ) 5.8 - - -
ThiH..ann (Communist) 7.0 6.4 13.2 10.2
Hindenburg - 48.3 49.5 53.0
Duesterberg (National. ) - - 6.8 -
Hitler (Nation. Soc. ) - - 30.1 36.8
Winter (Right Lib.) - - 0.3 -
other 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Turnout 68.9 77 .6 86.2 83.5 I
Cell entries: perceol ofvalid vote
historians, I will concentrate on the former. In order to get an idea at
the county level of how the Hindenburg vote of 1925 corresponds to
the strength of other parties and candidates, the approximately 1,200
counties of Weimar Germany (regrouped into 831 county units in
order to cope with numerous administrative boundary changes)2 are
split up into quintiles according to the strength of the 1925 Hinden-
burg vote. We thus get five categories with an equal number of coun-
ties in each. For each category we assess the percentage ofvoters won
by other parties or candidates than Hindenburg in a series of elections
between December 1924 and July 1932. If there is a low percentage
of votes for the other parties and candidates in the first quintile (where
the Hindenburg vote was lowest) and a growing percentage of votes
in the following quintiles (where Hindenburg fared better), we have
a positive statistical relationship between the two votes. The correla-
tion coefficient therefore is positive in sign and rather high in magni-
tude. This is the case for the statistical association between the Hi.nden-
burg vote on the one hand, and the vote for the German National
2. For some formal aspects of this data set which contains about 1,200 cases and more than
700 variables see Dirk Hanisch, "Inhalt und Struktur der Datenbank 'Wahl- und Sozialdaten der
Kreise und Gemeinden des Deutschen Reiches von 1920-1933, '" Historical Social Research 14
(1989): 39-67. The ICPSR data set on Weimar elections unfortwlately has some serious
shortcomings which make it not advisable to use it without m'\ior revisions. SeeJiirgen W Falter
and WolfD. Gmner, "Minor and Major Flaws ofa Widely Used Data Set: The ICPSR 'German
Weimar Republic Data 1919-1933' under Scmtiny," Historical Social Research 6 (1981): 1-26.
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TABLE 2: SOME PARTY-VOTE CORRELATES OF THE 1925 HINDENBURG VOTE
F_irst. Ballot 1925
Jarres (OVP/ONVP) 11. 8 22.4 3
Held (Bav. Cath. ) 1.6 2.8
Ludendorff (Vo1k) 0.4 0.6
Braun (SPO) 14.5 20.7 2
Marx (eath. ) 27.7 9.5
Hellpach (OOP) 3.2 5.0
Thalmann (Carom. ) 5.1 6.2
Nonvoters 35.7 32.6 2
_.__ ...._-----------
May 1928
Nationalists 5.0 8.5
Nat.-Socialists 0.9 1.8
Right Liberal 4.4 6.8
Left Liberal 2.6 4.3
Splinter Parties 7.9 9.1 1
September 1930
Nationalists 3.4 4.8
Nat.-Socialists 9.3 13.9 1
Right Liberal 2.6 4.1
Left Liberal 2.6 3.5
Splinter Parties 8.0 9.1
----
-_...-~---_ ......_--
--------
---I
VOTE (QUINTILES)
I3 4 5 ALL R
......._-----.._- .._..J
6.5 21.3 32.4 16.2 .76
2.8 4.1 4.6 2.4 .55
9.6 9.5 7.0 8.0 .22
5.9 4.6 3.4 5.0 .02
7.1 5.3 7.7 5.9 .13
-------
--·0
0.2 35.1 45.5 26.6 .87
3.2 3.2 1.8 2.6 .03
0.7 1.8 1.0 0.7 .27
5.0 22.4 15.6 19.9 .20
3.2 1.9 2.2 9.9 -.69
4.8 3.3 2.3 4.0 -.04
4.4 4.0 1.9 4.8 -.21
8.5 28.9 29.7 31.1 .19
------------I--
0 3 12.9 23.6 10_8 .63
2.1 3.1 2.6 2.0 .29
7.7 7.7 5.6 6.6 .19
4.3 3.4 2.7 3.7 .06
1.8 11.8 14.2 10.6 .27
------ ---- f---.--
5.2 6.7 11.9 5.7 .47
6.1 18.6 20.3 15.0 .63
4.2 4.2 2.9 3.9 .10
3.8 2.8 2.2 3.2 -.00
1.8 11.8 14.2 11.3 .37
------- ----
3.2 40.3 32.2 8.6 -.59.
.7 36.8 45.6 30.9 .82
.1 6.9 3.9 44.5 -.29
----
"'---f---- ...
4.9 6 • .1 8.7 5.2 .57
4.9 37.7 45.4 31.4 .79
1.2 1.1 0.8 1.0 .10
1.0 0.8 0.5 0.8 .04
2.9 2.1 2.9 1.7 .05
-------+... -
3
1
4
33
8
12.7
1.7
8.1
5.8
5.5
4.2
28.3
1.1
1.1
2.7
45.2
27.4
10.2
6.5
0.7
4.9
3.7
4.5
51. 9
18.9
9.6
3.0
18.7
0.7
0.5
2.2
Dec. 1924
Nationalists
Nat~-Socialists
Right Liberal
Left. Liberal
Splinter Parties
2nd Ballot 1932
Hindenburg
Hitler
Thalmann
July 1932
Nationalists
Nat.-Socialists
Right Liberal
Left Liberal
Splinter Parties
Cdl entries: pen;"nt of total electoF.lle (eligible ....oters).
Nationalists: DNVP; Nal.vSocialists: NSDAP (1924: NSFB); Right Lib..:ra1: DVP; left Liberal: DDP {193?: DS1P)
Reading erample: In July 1932 the NSDAP share of the ele-=torate was 18.7% in the: first quintile. i.e. those 20 percent of the &31 county units
whi:'re the 1925 Hinder-burg vote wns lowe:.t; in the fifth quintile (i.e. 'l/h~re!.he Hindenburg: vote was high~sl) the 1932 Nazi vow WAS 45.'.1-
perccnl.
Party (DNVP) or the volkisch-Nazi coalition in the late-1924 par-
liamentary elections. A positive correlation also exists between the
Hindenburg vote and the vote for the joint presidential candidate of
the DNVP and the right-liberal DVP on the first ballot of 1925, Karl
Jarres. In other words, the higher the Hindenburg vote of 1925 was
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in a county, the higher, on the average, the DNVP orJarres vote was
in that same county. The opposite applies to candidates who won
relatively more votes in the first than in the subsequent Hindenburg
quintiles, as is the case with Wilhelm Marx, his close competitor of
1925. The correlation coefficient still is comparatively high, but now
of course negative in sign.
We thus find out that German Nationalists and the 1924 coalition of
volkisch and national-socialist splinters, as well asJarres, displayed the
same distribution ofvotes as Hindenburg did: they fared much better,
on the average, in counties where Hindenburg was strong than in
counties where Hindenburg was weak. For example, in the 165 coun-
ties of the first quintile, the Jarres vote amounted to not more than
1 I. 8 percent of the electorate, while in the fifth quintile, theJarres vote
was up to 45.5 percent. In addition, there is a slight, curvilinear re-
lationship between the Hindenburg vote and each of the following:
turnout; the vote for the first-ballot candidate of the volkisch Right,
Erich von Ludendorff; and, quite unexpectedly, the vote for the first-
ballot presidential candidate of the Social Democrats, Otto Braun.
2.2. Some ecological regression estimates of the "true" voterfluctuations
to andfrom Paul von Hindenburg in 1925
It would be quite hazardous to interpret these findings in terms of
individual or group relationships-to assume, that is, that all or most
Hindenburg voters were necessarily former Jarres and DNVP voters.
So-called ecological fallacies, such as the erroneous assumption that
the relationships of one level of analysis would be equivalent to the
other, could (but by no means necessarily must) result from such a
tacit assumption ofcongruence. 3 To get somewhat better estimates of
voter fluctuations, one has to take into consideration the development
of the other parties or candidates as well. This is done by multiple
ecological regression analysis-a powerful but somewhat dangerous
statistical technique that bases its estimates on rather "strong" distribu-
tional premises such as linearity, non-contextuality of relationships,
etc. Only if these premises are met by the data (which we cannot fully
know) can the estimates of ecological regression equations be inter-
3· See Hayward R. Alker, Jr., '~ Typology of Ecological Fallacies," in Mattei Dogan and
Stein Rokkan, cds., Quantitative Ecological Analysis in the Sorial Sciences (Cambridge, Mass.,
1969), 69-86. W S. Robinson, "Ecological Correlations and the Behavior of Individuals,"
Americafl Sociological Review 40 (1950): 351-57.
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TABLE 3: FROM WHAT PARTIES DID lliE HINDENBURG VOTERS COME, AND TO
WHAT PARTIES DID THEY GO? SOME RESULTS OF ECOLOGICAL REGRESSION
ANALYSIS
Cell ewri..·s: Tr:msilion probabilities, ..:.stilT'.atcd by multiple regrcsSt0rl :i11Blysis; county level data. "From":= percentage 'If party dcclorntc
switching to Bindcnburg; ~To· =:: percenrnge of Hindcnburg voters switching to one of the indic~ted parries.
Abbreviations: RT = Reichslag election; PR = Presidential election; RT24B = Reichstag =Iection Dec~mber 1924; PR25B := pn':.~identidt
Election, April 192.5 (second hanot); RT28 = R~ichstag election 1928; RT32A = Reichstag election, July 1932. etc
preted as "true" individual level fluctuations. Ifnot, they still represent
a good aggregate level estimate of the statistical relationship between
the development of the Hindenburg vote and the vote for other parties
and candidates. Since we cannot completely know if all assumptions
of the method are really met, we should restrict our interpretation of
the findings to differences of magnitude. 4
Tables 3 and 4 report some ecological regression estimates of the
voter fluctuations to and from Hindenburg. The cell entries represent
percentages. The first column of numbers of Table 3 informs about
the transition probability ofthe December 1924 Reichstag voters from
the parties indicated at the left of the table to Hindenburg. According
to these estimates, between three-quarters and four-fifths of all right-
wing voters (i.e., NSFB, DNVP, DVP, and various splinter parties)
of December 1924 seem to have supported their joint second-ballot
presidential candidate, Hindenburg. From the other parties and the
nonvoters, only a rather insignificant minority seems to have voted
for Hindenburg. The flux of voters from the various candidates of the
4. To control for the effect of nonlinear, contextual influences ill the following an extension
ofmultiple ecological regression analysis with product variables is IIscd. For details seeJan··Bernd
LohmolJer ct aI., "Unemployment and the Rise of National Socialism: Contradicting Results
from Different Regional Aggregations," in Peter Nijkamp, cd., Measuring the Unmeasurable (The
Hague, [985), 357-70. Also JUrgen W Falter and Reinhard Zintl, "The Economic Crisis of the
1930's and the Nazi Vote: An Attempt at Explanation by Means of a Rational Choice Approach
and Ecological Regression Analysis, "Journal oj Interdisciplirul1}' History 19 (19 88): 55-85·
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TABLE 4: VOTER FLUCTIJATIONS BETWEEN THE FIRST AND SECOND BALLOT
OF THE TWO PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS OF 1925 AND 1932
PR25AjPR25B PR25BjPR32A PR32AjPR32B
To Hindenburg From Hindenburg To Hindenburg
from to from
Jarres 95 Duesterberg 12 Duesterberg 15
Hindenburg 20 Hindenburg 94
Ludendorff 45 Hitler 52 Hitler 4
Braun 4 Thalmann 5 Thalmann 5
Marx 9 Winter 0 Winter 16
Hellpach 22 Other 0 Other 45
Th~ilmann 15 Nonvoting 10 Nonvoting 13
Cell entries: Transition probabilities, ~stimated by multipla: lrcological regression analysis.
Regding eJaJmpk: Almost 100 perea:nt of the Jures voters swit.ch£d to Hindenburg during the second ballot of the 1925 presidential elections; and
about 50 pcr-cent of the 1925 Hindenburg voters seem to bave voted foc Adolf Hitler in the fin;l ballot of the 1932 pn:sidential elections.
first ballot to Hindenburg which is reported in the first column of
Table 4 seems to follow the same pattern: almost all of the Jarres
supporters joined the Hindenburg camp in the second round, while
almost no fluctuation existed between Braun and Marx on the one
hand and von Hindenburg on the other.
2.3. Mlhere did the Hindenburg voters go after 1925?
Tables 2-4 also suggest where Hindenburg's voters went after 1925.
At the aggregate (that is, the county) level there is a rather strong
positive relationship between the Hindenburg vote of 1925 and the
later vote of the DNVP; there is also a much smaller but still positive
relationship with the splinter parties in 1928 and 1930 (which, in turn,
were mainly defectors from the German Nationalists).5 But already
in the Reichstag election of 1930, the NSDAP clearly overtook the
DNVP in statistical "closeness" to the Hindenburg vote of 1925. And
the correlation between the Hindenburg vote of 1925 and the Hider
second-ballot vote of 1932 (r=0.82!) is among the highest encoun-
tered in the whole data set: indeed, in this ballot, Hitler got less than
19 percent of the electorate in that 20 percent of the counties where
the 1925 Hindenburg vote was lowest, but gathered more than 45
percent in the highest quintile. The accompanying graph, a so-called
scatterplot, strikingly illustrates the remarkably close fit between the
1925 Hindenburg and the 1932 Hitler constituencies: where Hinden-
burg got many votes in 1925, Hitler tended to poll a significantly
5· See Falter and Zintl, "The Economic Crisis of the 1930'S and the Nazi Vote," also Jiirgen
W Falter, "The National Socialist Mobilisation of New Voters: 1928-1933," in Thomas Chil-
ders, ed., The Formation of the Nazi Constitllency 1919-1933 (London, 1986), 202-31.
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1925 Hindenburg Vote
above-average vote in 1932, and where Hindenburg fared poorly in
1925, so did Hitler in 1932 (see Chart I).
If we assume for the moment that we can fully trust our ecological
regression estimates, about every sixth Hindenburg voter of 1925
voted DNVP in 1928, and every fourth seems to have voted SPD.
The latter result, which at first sight looks quite contraintuitive, was
probably due to the influx ofnew voters into the SPD in 1928 - voters
who, according to other ecological regression findings, seem to have
voted DNVP in 1924 (and consequently Hindenburg in 1925) and
probably defected to the Nazis after 1928. The current findings suggest
that about 20 percent of former Hindenburg partisans voted for the
Nazis in 1930-a number that accounts for almost halfof the NSDAP
electorate ofthat year. Other parties, with the quite plausible exception
Copyright © 2001. All Rights Reserved.
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TABLE 5: THE CORRELATION OF THE HELD VOTE WITH THE HINDENBURG
AND MARX VOTE IN BAVARIA
1924B BVP Vote (Ouintile.) 1925A Held Vote (Quintiles)
1st Ballot 1 2 3 4 5 r 2nd Ballot 1 2 3 4 5 r
Jarres 27 18 9 7 6 -74 Hindenburq 44 37 33 40 40 -09
Marx 3 2 2 1 1 -10 Marx 32 26 20 16 16 -57
Thalmann 3 2 1 1 1 -42 Thalmann 3 2 1 1 1 -53
Nonvoting 35 42 51 50 48 47 Nonvoting 21 34 46 43 43 58
Braun 23 15 9 8 5 -70
Marx 3 2 2 1 1 -10
Hellpac:h 3 2 1 1 1 -50
Ludendorff 2 3 2 1 1 -48
Held 4 16 25 32 37 92
Cell entries: percent of electorat~ and Pearwn cOl'T'elation coefficients; county data, weighted by number of eligible voten.
Reading example: In those 166 counties where the BVP (and Held) vote was highest onJy 6 percent of the electorate voted for Jarres during the
lst ballot, but 40 percent voted for Hindenburg during the second ballot.
of the splinter parties, were not able to gain substantial numbers of
Hindenburg's 1925 voters.
2.4. A closer look at the contribution offormer Held and Thiilmann voters
to the electoral success of the Hindenburg ticket
In some accounts of the 1925 presidential election, Hindenburg's sec-
ond-ballot victory is attributed either to the refusal ofthe Communists
to withdraw their candidate, Ernst Thalmann, or to the decision of
the Catholic Center's Bavarian sister party, the BVP, to support the
arch-Prussian Protestant Hindenburg instead of the Rhenish Catholic
Marx. Either the KPD or the BVP is thus held responsible for taking
away the approximately 500,000 swing votes that would have assured
victory to Wilhelm Marx. Putting the blame upon the Communists
seems to me a bit farfetched: given the explicit enmity of this party
toward the Weimar "capitalist state," it would have been completely
unrealistic to expect the KPD to support the candidate of the Weimar
system. On the other hand, the BVP's decision to support Hindenburg
instead of Marx may indeed have been crucial. It is therefore worth-
while to analyze how many votes the Bavarian party's decision might
have cost the candidate of the Weimar coalition.
In Bavaria, Hindenburg outpolled Marx by more than 15 percent-
age points, as compared to only 3 points in the Reich as a whole. 6
Table 5 reports percentage distributions and correlation coefficients
6. Regional results inJiirgen W Falter et al., Wahlen und Abstimmungen in der Weimarer Republik:
Materialien zum Wahlverhalten 1919-1933 (Munich, 1986), 46, 73-79.
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TABLE 6: VOTING TRANSITIONS IN BAVARIA FROM THE 1ST TO TIlE 2ND
BALLOT OF TIlE 1925 REICHSPRASIDENT ELECTIONS
(ECOLOGICAL REGRESSION ESTIMATES)
___-L.- _
All
1st Ball.
"----I----~-
15.5
19.8
13.5
1.7
43.9
Nonvoting
85 13 0
60 22 16
10 68 20
33 40 24
21 13 64
38.9 23. 5 ...I._.~.~.:7
Second Ballot
Hindenburg Marx1st Ballot
All 2nd Ballot
Jarres
Held
Braun
Marx
Nonvoting
Cell enrrics: Transition probabilities estimated by multiple ecological regression analysis; COUTlty datil..
Reading example: about 60 percent of the 1st ballot Held voters l!ecm to have voted in favor t1fHindenburg at the 2nd blllloT,
and only about 22 percent for the Catholic Center ~B.ndidateMarx.
fast column: percent of valid votes won by Jarrcs, Held. etc. in the first ballot of the 1925 Presidential elections; last row: p~rceJ1t of valid ....etcs.
won by Hindcnburg and Marx in the second ballot of the 1925 Presidenti.al .::lections.
for Bavaria, while Table 6 displays transition probabilities. The effects
of the BVP's recommendation for Hindenburg are clearly discernible.
On the first ballot, Jarres got only 6 percent of the eligible voters in
that 20 percent of the Bavarian counties where the BVP vote of the
previous December was highest; the overall correlation coefficient is
rather strong and negative in sign ( - 0.74). By contrast, Hindenburg
was able to collect 40 percent of the electorate in the heaviest BVP (and
first-ballot Held) precincts. By the same token, Marx won many
fewer votes here than might have been expected. Table 6 indicates that
approximately 60 percent of the first-ballot Held partisans followed
their party's recommendation and voted for Hindenburg on the sec-
ond ballot, compared to only about 20 percent who switched to Marx.
This would indeed imply that about half a million votes could be
attributed to the BVP's unfortunate recommendation. In the light of
Hindenburg's past political record, the BVP's electoral policy may be
characterized as shortsighted if not frivolous.
3. THE 1932 H1NDENBURG ELECTION
It is well known that Hindenburg's presidential record was far better
until 1930, or even March 1932, than many liberal and socialist com-
mentators had expected. In 1932, the Weimar coalition parties even
regarded the Field Marshal as the only chance to keep Hitler and the
NSDAP from power. Thus, at the age of 85, much against his own
Copyright © 2001. All Rights Reserved.
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1925 Hindenburg Vote
intention (he would have preferred either to head a right-wing ticket
or to be the "nonpolitical" candidate of the whole people), Hinden-
burg changed political camps in regard to the political parties support-
ing him. 7 It is interesting to explore the voters' reactions to this change
of coalitions and to investigate the parallels and differences between
the Hindenburg electorates of 1925 and 1932.
Another look at Table 2 shows that Hindenburg's electoral success
in 1932 was highest in those counties where he was least successful in
1925. Hitler, on the other hand, was able to draw much more electoral
support in the old Hindenburg strongholds than Hindenburg himself
(see also Chart 2). If the transition probabilities in Table 4 are indeed
7. See Karl Dietrich Bracher, Die Au.flo'sllng deT Weimarer Rlpublik: Eine Stlldie zum Problem des
Machtzerfalls in der Detnokratie (Villingen, 1955),443-80.
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TABLE 7: SOME SOCIAL CORRELATES OF TIlE 1925 AND 1932 PRESIDENTIAL
VOTE
% Catholic
% Urban
% Farming Pop.
% Industry
% Selfemployed
% Civil Servants
% White Collar
% Blue Collar
% Unemployed WC
% Unemployed BC
37
21
-26
25
-18
05
21
-08
21
27
-65
-22
28
-34
15
03
-20
11
-22
-37
PR1932B
Hitler Hindenburg
--- ~
-68 71
-28 00
2B 01
-23 -04
18 12
-09 06
-29 05
-28 00
-27 -04
-27 -10
----_ ~
County daTa (0=831); cases weighted by population.
unbiased, Hitler was able to get the support on the first ballot ofabout
50 percent of the 1925 I-Iindenburg voters (and about 60 percent on
the second ballot, when many of the conservative first-ballot Duester-
berg voters switched to the Nazi leader). From the perspective ofvoter
fluctuations, Hindenburg seems to have lost his old constituency. He
was reinstated in office by his former opponents, the folIowers of the
Catholic Center Party, the Social Democrats, and the few remaining
left-liberals of the DDPIDStP.
The social correlates of the vote of the two main contenders of 1925
and 1933, as displayed in Table 7, reveal the radical rearrangement
undergone by the Hindenburg voting coalition. In 1925, the Hinden-
burg vote was lower in predominantly Catholic, in urban, indus-
trialized districts, and in regions where unemployment was above
average. By contrast, the Hindenburg vote of 1932 increased with the
number of Catholics and self-employed in the district. And Hitler's
constituency of 1932, like Hindenburg's of 1925, was located in pre-
dominantly Protestant counties, in rural areas, and in districts with
lower than average unemployment rates. 8
The information presented in Table 7 is bivariate in character: only
two variables are compared at one time. The real world, however, is
8. Quite unexpectedly the Nazis fared much better in districts with low levels of unemploy-
ment. On the average, the unemployed seem to have been dearly underrcpresented among Nazi
voters. See Jiirgcn W. Falter, "Unemployment and the Radicalisation of the Gcrman Electorate
1928.. 1933: An Aggregate Data Analysis with Special Emphasis on thc Rise of National
Socialism," in Pcter Stachura, ed., Umcmployment and tlte Great Depression in Weimar Germany
(Houndsmill/London, [<)86), 187-208, andJiirgen W. Falter, Hitler.' Waltler (Munich, 1991),
292-3 '4.
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different: nobody is only Catholic or Protestant, only young or old,
only farmer or blue-collar worker. The same is true for the territorial
units which form the basis of the analysis: county units are Catholic
and rural and predominantly agrarian, etc. To account for this mix of
social characteristics, one may combine some of the most important
explanatory properties of the counties in a tree comparison (Table 8). In
order to construct such a "tree," we first divide the 831 county units
of the Reich into three subgroups according to the percentage of
Catholics living in these counties (religious denomination is by far the
most important predictor ofthe Hitler and Hindenburg vote in 193 2!).
For these three subgroups of counties, we calculate the average per-
centage of Hindenburg, Hitler, and Marx voters. In the next step the
three denominational county classes are then divided according to
their degree ofurbanization. Again the average percentage ofHinden-
burg, Hitler, and Marx voters is calculated for each of the resulting six
groups. We thus find, for example, that the Hindenburg vote was far
below average in rural Catholic areas in 1925 (23 percent); in 1932,
however, Hindenburg was able in these very same counties to mobilize
59 percent of the eligible voters, while Adolf Hitler was able to win
only 19 percent of the electorate in this branch ofour tree. In the next
and fmal step, the resulting six county classes are again divided into
three sub-classes each, according to the prevalent economic sector, so
that we are now looking at 18 different county categories which are
socially and politically more homogeneous than the less differentiated
branches of the tree above this last level. We then determine the share
of the vote in each of the eighteen branches for the three main con-
tenders of the two elections under consideration. 9
While space constraints prohibit a detailed description, one can
readily see from the "tree" that the Hindenburg voting coalition under-
went a radical change: the distribution of Hindenburg votes in 1932
is much closer to that of the Marx vote of 1925 than to the first
Hindenburg vote. Likewise, the Hitler vote of 1932 closely matches
the Hindenburg vote of 1925: in those socially defined subgroups
where Hindenburg's showing was strong in 1925, Hitler gathered an
above-average share of the votes in 1932, and vice versa. From this
perspective, the conservative and right-wing voter coalition that
9· Analogous "trees" for all major parties and Weimar elections are presented in Jiirgen W
Falter et aI., Wahlen und Abstimmul'\~e'l in der Weimarer Republik, 194-203.
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Whole Reich
catholic Mixed Protelitaut
Rural Urban
Agrar Indu.t Service Agrar Indu.t. Sarvict<
[
5[32!,
- -I
- -
Rural Urban
Agrar Indust Service Agrar Indust Service
I~i 3_281
r~~~~~~I_~I!
Rural Urban
Agrar Indu.t Service Aqrar Indust Service
o
o
~
cO·
~
@
N
o
~
~
;0
cO·
::r
Ui
;0
CD(J)
CD
~
C.
N 188 21 31 15 43 17 36 226 84 114 38
Cell entries: percentage of total electorate (rounded).
"M" = Vote for Wilhelm Marx, April, 1925; "H" = vote for Adolf Hitler, April, 1932; "vH" = vote for Paul von
Hindenburg, April 1925 and April 1932.
"Catholic" = Catholic >66.6'; "Mixed" = Catholic 33.3 to 66.6%; "Protestant'· = Catholic <33.3%. "Rural" =
<50\ of county population living in' conununities with more than 5000 inhabitants; "Urban" = >50'" J..t.V lng in
conununities >5000 inhabitants. "Agrarian" = a relative majority of the county population is employed in the
agrarian sector of the economy, etc.
Reading example: In 1925 in predominantly rural Catholic counties with a dominance of the agrarian sector
only 24 percent of the elec"torate voted for Hindenburg; in 1932 in these very Bame counties exactly 60
percent did so.
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brought Hindenburg into power in the first Weimar presidential elec-
tion may indeed be described as the harbinger ofthe electoral triumphs
of the NSDAP of 1932 and 1933. It therefore may be interpreted as
the first effective gathering of the antirepublican forces that would
later bring the Weimar Republic to an end.10
4. DID INDEED MANY THALMANN VOTERS OF THE FIRST BALLOT
VOTE FOR HITLER IN THE SECOND BAI.LOT OF THE 1932
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION?
It is often suggested that the increase in Hitler's constituency (about 2
million votes) during the second ballot ofthe 1932 presidential election
may have been largely due to defections from the Communist leader
Ernst Thalmann, who lost about I. 2 million votes. This hypothesis,
which is based mostly on local impressionistic evidence (the proverbial
Communist tavern which changed colors overnight), is rooted in the
widespread conviction that ultimately the totalitarian extremes were
not so terribly far apart and that the step from the Communists to the
Nazis was much more readily taken than ideology or propaganda
might lead one to expect. This idea of the proximity of the extremes
finds additional theoretical endorsement in the conviction that many,
if not most, of Hitler's and Thalmann's followers were unpolitical,
socially uprooted products of mass society, so-called protest voters
who could easily be seduced by unrealistic promises and who therefore
fell prey to the totalitarian temptations of the time.11 However, little
quantitative evidence has ever been provided that would either prove
or disprove this transition hypothesis.
In Table 9A, the statistical relationship between the percentage point
change of the Thalmann and Hitler vote between the first and second
ballot of the 1932 presidential election is scrutinized. Again, quintiles
and correlation coefficients are examined. In contrast to Tables 2 and
5, however, we are now looking at so-called change variables, i.e.,
percentage-point differences of the vote between the first and second
ballot. What we fmd is a near-perfect independence of the develop-
TO. In fact in the multivariate model the Hindenburg vote of 1925 (which in turn may be
interpreted as a proximity measure of a right-wing political tradition) is the second best predictot
of the Nazi vote (after the religious composition of the counties)! SeeJilrgen W. Falter and Dirk
Hanisch, "Die Anfalligkeit von Arbeitern gegenilber der NSDAP bei den Reichstags\vahlen
1928-1933," Archiv fir Sozialgeschichte 26 (1986): 179-216.
1I. See Alfred Milatz, Wahlen urnl Wiihlcr in der Weimarer Republik (Bonn, 1965), 138-39, 14I.
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TABLE 9: TIIE TRANSITION BEHAVIOR OF THE THALMANN VOTERS IN REGARD
TO HINDENBURG AND HITLER (A: CHANGE VARIABLES AND B: ECOLOGICAL
REGRESSION ESTIMATES)
9A: CHANGE VARIABLES AND CORRELATION COEffiCIENTS AT THE COUNTY LEVEL
(BIVARIATE RELATIONSHIPS)
-----~~~~~~~~-~-~-----.--
Change of: 1932 Thalmann Vote (Quint.)
1 2 3 4 5 r
1932 Hitler Vote (QU111_'_t_'_)+-_r~~~'~j
1 2 3 4 5
------~~~~~~~~-_.
Hindenburg 2.6 2.2 1.4 0.9 1.5 12 1.5 1.6 1.0 1.2 2.5 11
Hitler 2.6 5.0 5.3 4.7 4.6 01 0.4 2.7 4.2 5.8 9.2 100
Thalmann -0.5 -1.2 -1.9 -2.8 -4.8 100 -2.2 -3.4 -3.1 -2.9 -2.5 01
Duesterbg.
-16 -1.9 -3.3 -4.5 -6.6 -12.7 -83
.J._---
-----------
-------_._--------
-----------------
Cell emries: pcrc~ntllgc point change ~nd Pellrson correlation coeffi.:i,;:nts, county level data.
Reading example: In those 20% of the counti.-:s where (the Communist candidate) Ern.st Thalmann loa most (=ao :lvernge of 4.8 percentage
poir.ts in comparison '0 the first ballot), lhc Hindenburg vote increased by 1.5 pcrct=.ntage points in the JJecond baIlor oftlu: 193'2 prellidenti:ll
elections, etc.
9B: ECOLOGICAL REGRESSION ESTIMATES
r----~ ~~~~-~~__,___--- ---~~.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--------,
SECOND BALLOT
Hindenburg Hitler Thalmann Nonvoters
First Ballot
Hindenburg 94 2 1 3
Duesterberg 15 50 7 28
Hitler 4 96 0 0
Thalmann 5 13 62 21
Nonvoters 13 2 3 82
Cell mtries: Transition probabilities, estimated by multiple regression analysis; counties weighted by number of eligible votC\"8.
Reading example: 50 percent ofibe 1st-ballot Duesterberg supporters voted for Hitlel' in the 2nd ballot oflhe 1932 pre'!>idential t:1~ctionJ -:t¢,
ment of the Hitler and Thalmann vote. There is absolutely no linear
relationship at the county level between the increase of the Hitler
constituency and the decrease of the Thalmann electorate. In those 166
counties where the increase of the Hitler vote was strongest (9.2 per-
centage points on the average), Thalmann lost only 2.6 percentage
points; and in those other 166 counties where the increase of the Hitler
vote was smallest (0.4 percentage points), the decline of the Thalmann
electorate was about the same as in the highest quintile (2.2 percentage
points). The correlation coefficient accordingly is zero (0.01). Hence,
at the (bivariate) aggregate level there is no empirical basis for the old
Thalmann-to-Hitler transition hypothesis.
If we take into consideration the development of the other candi-
dates, however, we get somewhat different results. In a multiple re-
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gression analysis of the percentage-point change of the Hitler vote,
we detect a small but significant positive relationship: the increase of
the Hitler vote from March to April 1932, was somewhat higher
where the Thalmann vote was above average in the first ballot or
declined more strongly from the first to the second ballot, as the
standardized regression coefficients of the following two equations
show:
DiffHitl = 0.797 % Duesterberg + o. II4 % Thalmann - 0.067
%Hindenburg - 0.090 % Nonvoters.
and, when using change variables on both sides of the equation:
Diffi-litl = -0.941 DiffDuesterberg - 0.111 DiffThalmann - 0.245
DiffHindenburg.
The ecological regression estimates amount to about 13 percent of
former Thalmann voters switching to AdolfHitler in the second ballot
(see Table 9B). This would imply that almost 30 percent of the new
Hitler voters would indeed have been former Thalmann followers.
Another 20 percent of the Thalmann supporters seem to have
abstained during the second round of the presidential election. But
according to the same ecological regression findings, the vast majority
of the new Hitler voters of April 1932-about 60 percent-were
former Duesterberg supporters. Again, the voter fluctuation seems to
have been more complex and differentiated than is normally assumed.
If these ecological regression estimates are correct, then there were a
few hundred thousand first-round Thalmann voters who joined the
ranks of the Hitler coalition. While they made up neither a majority
of Thalmann defectors nor ofnew Hitler recruits, they are sufficiently
numerous to give credence to the local events and personal experiences
reported in the biographical literature.
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